During a visit to India this week, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer met with Nandan Nilekani, the architect of India’s Aadhaar digital identity system, to explore how lessons from the Indian model might inform a new digital ID regime in the the United Kingdom.
Aadhaar is a biometric identity system launched in India about fifteen years ago. It assigns a unique 12-digit number linked to individuals’ fingerprints and iris scans. Nearly all Indians, numbering over a billion people, now hold such an ID, and the system processes tens of millions of daily transactions.
Starmer praised Aadhaar as a “massive success” in streamlining access to public services and cutting fraud. Still, he emphasized that the UK’s proposed version would differ substantially: it would be developed in the public sector, avoid biometric data, and be shaped by public consultation.
The UK Proposal: Scope and Intent
Starmer’s government says the digital ID would eventually be mandatory for all workers to prove their legal right to work. Beyond employment, the government envisions using the ID for applications to schools and universities, mortgages, and driver’s licences.
Officials say the ID would be digital (for example, held via smartphones) rather than a physical card. People would not be required to carry it at all times or be asked to produce it routinely, except in particular verification processes like “Right to Work” checks.
The stated aims include reducing illegal working, tightening border control, and simplifying access to public services such as tax, welfare, and licensing.
Opposition and Public Response
From the outset, the proposal has met strong resistance. A parliamentary petition against the plan has amassed over 2.8 million signatures. Civil liberties groups, opposition parties, and some Labour MPs have raised concerns around surveillance, privacy, data security, and the potential for coercive enforcement.
Public opinion has shifted markedly: support for digital ID has dropped following the announcement. Before, some 53% of Britons backed the idea; after, support fell to around 31 %, with 45 % opposed. Some observers attribute the shift more to dissatisfaction with Starmer personally than objections to the concept itself.
Critics also argue that existing systems (such as the National Insurance number, driving licences, passport, and other proofs of identity) already serve many of the proposed functions, making a new central ID scheme unnecessary.
In addition, several technology firms have rebuffed involvement. For example, Palantir declined to engage, citing concerns about democratic legitimacy and the risks of mass digital identifiers.
Historical Context and Risks
Compulsory identity cards are not new to the UK. During the two world wars, such cards were introduced for national security and rationing, but they were abolished after each conflict. In 2006 the Labour government passed the Identity Cards Act, creating a national identity register and optional identity cards; but that Act was repealed in 2011 under a Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition. One reason for repeal was widespread public concern about privacy, data misuse, and scope creep of authority.
Some observers warn that without robust oversight and transparent safeguards, a digital ID could enable surveillance and centralization of personal data. Others caution that it may not significantly curb illegal migration or work, especially if people find workarounds or the system is breached.
What’s Next
The British government aims to introduce the digital ID by the end of the current parliamentary term, which runs until 2029. Legislation will be required, and the government plans public consultation on design, scope, and safeguards. Starmer has defended the initiative as part of a broader push to modernize state functions and assert control over immigration.
Still, given the scale of public opposition, legal and political challenges lie ahead. Whether the plan can be implemented in a way that balances efficiency, security, and civil liberties remains an open question.
